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THE RETURN OF J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE FBI’S REVERSION TO 
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
 
By Zehra Naqvi* 
Q  :  Which method(s) are you comfortable with the FBI 
employing to shore up our domestic security?  
a)  Active investigation of a Quaker-affiliated or-
ganization1  
b)  Recording the license plate numbers of 
peaceful environmentalist protestors2 
c)  Monitoring anti-war demonstrations3 
d)  Intercepting emails by political activists4 
e)  All of the above. 
 
If you answered “e,” you’re in luck.  You’re on board with 
the FBI’s current efforts to make us safer.  If, on the other hand, 
you don’t recall authorizing such tactics to enhance your security 
and feel that they are vaguely reminiscent of McCarthyism-era 
tactics, join the club.  Our tax dollars are being wasted on col-
lecting more useless information instead of analyzing the useful 
information we already have. 
After the domestic spying outrage that occurred in the 1950s 
and 1960s, we had safeguards put into effect to prevent exactly 
these kinds of activity from occurring again, but they were dis-
mantled by this Administration; the Administration played on 
our fears about a repeat of 9/11 and claimed that our security was 
at risk by the restrictive nature of the guidelines.  In fact, the 
guidelines were protecting us from ourselves or the FBI manifes-
tation of us.  Watering them down is an attempt to hoodwink the 
American population into sanctioning the removal of the safe-
guards and allowing the FBI to break the bargain made in the 
1970s to refrain from engaging in such political intelligence 
gathering.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is beat-
ing its drums to warn the public and hoping that we, the courts, 
and Congress hear the call and respond. 
THE BARGAIN: A HISTORY OF THE GUIDELINES 
“Knowledge is the key to control.  Secrecy should no 
longer be allowed to shield the existence of constitutional, 
legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of all three 
branches of government or from the American people     
themselves.”5   
 
Church Committee Report  
 
The FBI’s chief focus in the 1950s and 1960s was rooting 
out Communism, and to that end, the civil liberties of many indi-
viduals and groups were violated as the FBI pursued them with-
out any evidence or reasonable suspicion that any of them had 
actually committed any crimes.6  The political impetus to quash 
Communism rallied the agency into conducting heightened do-
mestic surveillance based on political ideology, stifling dissent, 
and political opposition.7  The FBI, under the auspices of Direc-
tor J. Edgar Hoover, ran a counterintelligence program, 
“COINTELPRO,” which investigated prominent activists and 
groups such as the National Organization for Women and the 
American Indian Movement.8  Ward Churchill’s book, The 
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars 
Against Dissent in the United States, documents some of the 
strategies employed by the FBI in its domestic “war against dis-
sent.”9  As revelations of the FBI’s investigatory abuses sur-
faced, Congress held hearings and in 1975, the Senate initiated 
an investigation into the abuses.10   
The Church Committee found that “the FBI had infiltrated 
civil rights and peace groups, had burglarized political groups to 
gain information about their members and activities, and had 
‘swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, 
views, and associations of American citizens.’”11  The Commit-
tee Report declared that there was “a consistent pattern in which 
programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing crimi-
nal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what 
witnesses characterized as ‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in infor-
mation about lawful activities of American citizens.”12  The FBI 
had created files on over one million Americans, investigated the 
NAACP for 25 years, compiled information on student groups 
for use in future applications to government jobs, and had a plan 
“to summarily arrest thousands of Americans in case of a na-
tional emergency.”13 
The Committee’s final report noted that “too often intelli-
gence has lost its focus and domestic intelligence activities have 
invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful as-
sembly and political expression.  Unless new and tighter controls 
are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities 
threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally 
alter its nature.”14  The report stated that a rise in Executive 
power, secrecy, and avoidance of the rule of law were the condi-
tions that facilitated the abusive practices.15  The report con-
cluded “the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal 
government's domestic security function that will ensure that the 
FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative agency, con-
centrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric 
or association.”16 
The Committee recommended prohibitions on the FBI, for-
bidding the agency from continuing its tactics of discrediting 
political opposition, media manipulation, distorting data to influ-
ence government policy and public perceptions, and preventing 
the free exchange of ideas.17  The Committee sought to achieve 
these ends by recommending that the FBI refrain from: 1) col-
lecting or disseminating information for a federal official for a 
political purpose; 2) interfering with constitutionally protected 
advocacy activities; 3) harassing individuals or physically intimi-
 dating them through obvious surveillance and interviews; and 4) 
maintaining dossiers on the political inclinations and private 
lives of Americans unless the demands of national security war-
rant such activities.18   
Attorney General Edward Levi issued new guidelines for 
FBI investigations in response to these findings, setting a higher 
standard for domestic surveillance by the FBI.19  Since the 
guidelines were adopted with legislative “consultation and over-
sight” through the Church Committee’s investigation and report, 
the guidelines have a “quasi-legislative status,” but did not have 
the force of actual legislation.20  Because the FBI adopted new 
guidelines for itself, the legislative effort to develop an FBI 
charter was abandoned.21  Until Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
unilateral changes to the guidelines in 2002, all revisions of the 
guidelines were made with Congressional consultation and over-
sight.22 
Attorney General Levi’s guidelines “specified that investi-
gations should be limited to exposing criminal conduct and 
should not involve simple monitoring of unpopular political 
views.”23  The FBI could only initiate investigations “where 
‘specific and articulable facts’ indicated criminal activity.”24  
Unpopular ideologies or political dissent were not considered 
sufficient reasons to justify an investigation or restraint on 
someone’s free practice of their First Amendment rights.25  The 
guidelines were somewhat diluted in the 1980s, but remained 
largely intact until Attorney General John Ashcroft changed 
them in 2002.26  
BREAKING THE BARGAIN: ASHCROFT’S REVISION OF 
THE GUIDELINES 
Eight months after the September 11th attacks, Attorney 
General Ashcroft unilaterally revised the guidelines without 
consulting with Congress, claiming that the FBI’s hands were 
tied on its terrorism investigations as a result of the old guide-
lines.27  The revised guidelines allowed the FBI to “freely infil-
trate mosques, churches, and synagogues and other houses of 
worship, listen in on online chat rooms and read message 
boards” without any indication of criminal activity, substantially 
lowering the barriers to civil liberty violations and increasing the 
likelihood that the FBI will be inundated with more informa-
tion.28  This essentially reversed the work of the Church Com-
mittee and marked the return of practices that were sanctioned 
under Hoover’s FBI reign, when the FBI engaged in “political 
intelligence” gathering, stealing membership lists of suspect 
organizations, and gathering vast amounts of information on 
innocent constitutionally protected activities.29  This is espe-
cially disturbing because the Attorney General Levi’s adoption 
of the guidelines is what prevented Congress from enacting leg-
islation to ensure that the FBI observe the rule of law and adhere 
to strict guidelines on opening and maintaining investigations.30 
Arguably, the changes are further unwarranted because in-
ternational terrorism investigations have generally been con-
ducted under a separate body of foreign intelligence guidelines 
that have traditionally been more lax than those governing do-
mestic surveillance.  It is therefore highly unlikely that the roll-
back of the domestic guidelines was meant to facilitate catching 
terrorists abroad.31  In effect, the revised rules blur the lines be-
tween international and domestic surveillance guidelines, deny-
ing American citizens the protections they have thus far enjoyed 
by subjecting them to greater invasions of privacy.32 
The three basic results of the changed guidelines are that 
without any “scintilla of suspicion”33 or guidance as to what 
information must be recorded or how long a group can be moni-
tored, the FBI can: 1) attend domestic public group meetings; 2) 
mine various commercial databases and share the information; 
and 3) cut down on internal review procedures, essentially 
eliminating a level of scrutiny.34 
In addition to threatening the civil liberties of groups and 
individuals and risking a return to gathering political intelli-
gence on groups, the changed guidelines also pose the serious 
risk of undermining efficient intelligence gathering since the 
“vacuum cleaner” approach will be reinstalled in place of tar-
geted intelligence-gathering efforts; more information might 
undermine the agency’s ability to sift through and analyze its  
usefulness, and thereby actually hamper the fight against terror-
ism.35  The guidelines adopted by Attorney General Levi “were 
intended to make the FBI’s security operations more efficient by 
tying FBI inquiries and investigations to some modest showing 
that they were focused on suspected criminal or terrorist activity 
for security reasons.”36  The recent revisions detract from this 
goal and reverse the positive trend of the past half century.37 
THE AFTERMATH: BAD HABITS DIE HARD 
News articles over the past two years demonstrate that re-
cent surveillance activities of political demonstrations are rais-
ing public concerns that the FBI is once again engaging in ques-
tionable practices.38  Some of these activities are conducted 
through the new domestic surveillance program, made up of 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), which partners local law 
enforcement with federal agents and other officers to combat 
terrorism.39  The Associated Press reported that “[t]here are ter-
rorism task forces in 100 cities and with more than 3,700 mem-
bers, including at least 2,000 FBI agents, state and local police, 
and other federal law enforcement officials.  More than half of 
the task forces were formed after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001.”40  In total, there are 66 JTTFs.41 
The amended guidelines opened the door for JTTFs to en-
gage in many forms of domestic spying, specifically by allowing 
law enforcement to have free reign on monitoring online activi-
ties, private sector databases, and religious houses of worship, 
and once again being able to monitor innocuous First Amend-
ment activities without indication of any criminal activity, as the 
old guidelines required. 
The public should be concerned that current spying efforts 
are too broad, that these efforts have not only constituted an 
inefficient use of resources, but have also had a chilling effect 
on First Amendment freedoms.42  The public does not want their 
tax dollars spent for spying on groups that merely engage in 
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 civil disobedience nor do they want to “return to the days when 
peaceful critics become the subject of government investiga-
tions”43  The ACLU asserts that the FBI has been compiling 
license plate numbers from environmental and other group pro-
tests, monitoring peaceful demonstrations, intercepting emails, 
and trading political intelligence information with other law 
enforcement agencies.44  A New York Times article cited an FBI 
memo about monitoring demonstrations as proof, stating that 
there is “a coordinated nationwide effort to collect intelligence 
regarding demonstrations.”45  This article also cited a recent suit 
against the government, brought by critics of the current admini-
stration that found themselves on the “no-fly” lists after Septem-
ber 11th, as signaling “a return to the abuses of the 1960s and 
1970s, when J. Edgar Hoover was the FBI director and agents 
routinely spied on political protestors like the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.”46  The article quoted the executive director of 
the ACLU as saying, “[t]he FBI is dangerously targeting Ameri-
cans who are engaged in nothing more than lawful protest and 
dissent...[t]he line between terrorism and legitimate civil disobe-
dience is blurred.”47 
THE LAWSUIT: THE ACLU BEATING ITS DRUMS 
Perhaps the biggest concern of all is the widespread igno-
rance as to how the JTTFs operates and the extent of collabora-
tion between state legal enforcement entities and the FBI.48  In 
an effort to get a better understanding of the procedures and 
rules of operation behind the JTTFs, the ACLU recently filed a 
lawsuit to seek expedited processing of its Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) requests regarding general JTTF procedures 
and any information it might have collected on specific environ-
mental, religious, and civil liberty groups.  To enhance the law-
suit, the ACLU partnered with the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, Greenpeace, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, and United for Peace and Justice, in fil-
ing its lawsuit against the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) and Department of Justice in DC.49  The lawsuit requests 
injunctive relief to intervene in the expedited processing of the 
FOIA requests regarding the composition and procedures of the 
taskforce and the criteria that JTTFs use to select who to investi-
gate.50 
The Freedom of Information Act (1966) is significant as it 
established a federal law that recognized the right of the public 
to request information from federal government agencies.51  
There are exceptions as to what information can be requested, 
and some information may be redacted for security, confidenti-
ality, or other reasons.52  The national security exception may be 
used to block a FOIA request such as this one, because it asks 
for information regarding the inner workings of the JTTFs.53   
According to 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1)(iv), requestors who 
want the government to expedite their requests by processing 
these requests out of sequence seek expedited treatment and 
must demonstrate: 
(i)  Circumstances in which the lack of expedited treat-
ment could reasonably be expected to pose an im-
minent threat to the life or physical safety of an 
individual; 
(ii)  An urgency to inform the public about an actual or 
alleged federal government activity, if made by a 
person primarily engaged in disseminating infor-
mation; 
(iii) The loss of substantial due process rights; or 
(iv)  A matter of widespread and exceptional media in-
terest in which there exist possible questions about 
the government's integrity which affect public con-
fidence (emphasis added). 
The ACLU filed this lawsuit after the FBI failed to respond 
to their request for expedited processing of their FOIA re-
quests.54  The ACLU argues that it is entitled to expedite proc-
essing on the grounds of the second and fourth conditions.55  
Specifically, because the fear of “increased surveillance of po-
litical, religious, and community organizations by the FBI” 
might chill public participation in political activity, the ACLU, 
by virtue of its activities in defense of civil rights and civil liber-
ties, is an entity “primarily engaged in disseminating informa-
tion,”56 and thus has standing to seek such processing: 
There has been growing public concern about the 
FBI’s monitoring, surveillance, and infiltration of 
organizations on the basis of national origin, racial 
and/or ethnic background, religious affiliation, or-
ganizational membership, political views or affilia-
tion, or participation in protest activities or demon-
strations . . . [there has also been] cooperation be-
tween the FBI and local law enforcement to moni-
tor peaceful political demonstrations . . . [and] nu-
merous published reports of FBI agents questioning 
or spying on peace activists, anti-war activists, and 
person of Arab or Muslim background.57 
As a result, the ACLU asked the FBI to turn over all records 
regarding any of the plaintiffs in this action.58  Additionally, 
they requested all “records relating to the purpose, mission, and 
activities of JTTFs,” particularly those pertaining to domestic 
surveillance on the basis of political views.  The ACLU argues 
that the FBI has 1) failed to disclose any responsive records, and 
2) is improperly withholding the requested records.59 
The defendants responded on July 5, 2005 by arguing that: 
1) the ACLU has not met its burden for showing that expedited 
processing is appropriate; 2) “compelling need” is a narrow 
standard that is not met here; and 3) denial of such processing is 
subject to judicial review under a deferential standard.60 They 
also averred that the ACLU’s two FOIA requests encompassed 
93 subject matters and the FBI was going through its findings in 
a “methodical, organized approach.”61   
The defendants concluded that based on the articles cited by 
the ACLU, there is no current “exceptional media interest” or 
“urgency to inform the public,” since the media reports date 
back to 2004 and many of them do not directly mention the 
JTTFs or the plaintiffs.62  It also argues that the ACLU is not an 
entity “primarily engaged in disseminating information,” but 
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 rather a “litigation organization.”63  The overall case of the de-
fendants seems to be that the ACLU is merely citing its own 
concerns and that there is no real media interest or urgency to 
inform the public.64  They also caution that to allow this request 
to be expedited would open the floodgates to the ACLU and 
other organizations who want their requests fulfilled ahead of 
others on matters that are not sufficiently pressing.65  The defen-
dants, therefore, requested that the Court “(i) deny plaintiff’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction; (ii) grant defendants’ cross-
motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for 
expedited FOIA processing; and (iii) grant a stay of proceedings 
to permit further processing of the FOIA requests at issue.”66 
The ACLU, in its reply on July 19, 2005, countered that 
there is, in fact, a widespread media interest in the subject, and 
that their record of articles was merely exemplary, not all-
inclusive.67  Furthermore, the ACLU argued that the articles date 
back to 2004 because the FOIA requests were filed in 2004 and 
the FBI’s own delays in responding are to blame for the articles 
being outdated.68  The ACLU also argues that the FBI is making 
a “circular argument,” whereby the ACLU must demonstrate 
that files were maintained on it and the other plaintiffs in order 
to get the files about them, it is asking the ACLU to prove what 
it is trying to find out.69  The articles suggest that there has been 
“targeted monitoring and surveillance of Muslim and Arab 
Americans” and the problem is pervasive, urgent, and ongoing 
and thus merits close scrutiny by examination of the records.70 
Additionally, though the ACLU works to defend civil rights and 
civil liberties and uses litigation as one strategy to accomplish 
its work, it engages in the dissemination of information by pub-
lishing reports and newsletters, issuing email alerts, and upload-
ing such content on its website to further raise awareness about 
important issues.71   
The ACLU further points out that the one document the FBI 
has handed over “confirms the relevance of [the] articles to the 
subject of plaintiff’s requests” by showing that the FBI closely 
monitored United for Peace and Justice’s website and peaceful 
protests leading up to the Republican and Democratic national 
conventions and the 2004 election, noting its anti-war rhetoric 
and incorrectly describing it an “anarchist group.”72  The general 
public, the media, and legislators themselves have demonstrated 
a strong interest in the FBI’s activities and want to ensure that 
civil liberties are not being unjustly infringed in the name of 
national security.73  The Court should not grant a stay in pro-
ceedings, but rather grant the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, entitling the ACLU to expedited processing of its requests, 
or at least set up a reasonable schedule for the FBI to comply 
with the ACLU’s request.74  
SEEKING RECORDS, SEEKING CHANGE 
Whether or not the ACLU and its fellow plaintiffs succeed 
in getting the records they seek, it is unlikely that they will get 
all the information they want.  The lawsuit and the overall cam-
paign against increasingly intrusive FBI surveillance may, how-
ever, meet other types of success.  The ACLU’s campaign and 
lawsuit raises awareness about the FBI’s activities and might 
pressure Congress to conduct an investigation and issue binding 
guidelines on the agency.  It is important to ensure that the 
amended guidelines do not enable the agency to return to its pre-
1976 era practices.  Since Ashcroft unilaterally changed the 
guidelines, dismantling the bargain struck years ago when the 
creation of a FBI charter was abandoned, Congress should once 
again look closely at what the FBI is doing and how it is carry-
ing out domestic surveillance.  Political intelligence gathering is 
reprehensible and a misuse of resources at a critical time for 
national security. 
The public deserves to know how its state and federal re-
sources are being allocated for investigations and whether need-
less investigations are wasting resources.  The lack of informa-
tion and heightened secrecy of FBI procedures signal that we are 
regressing to old patterns and using domestic surveillance as a 
weapon against innocent Americans, thereby wasting resources 
and inundating our intelligence personnel with too much useless 
information.  When the FBI wastes resources in this way, the 
remaining resources dedicated to analysis of the helpful infor-
mation fall short.  Furthermore, such publicity and any informa-
tion that is released might also compel states to reevaluate their 
level of participation on JTTF activities and strengthen their 
resolve to balance the need to combat terrorism with cost-
effective, targeted, and reasonable investigations, instead of 
overarching strategies to keep ongoing terror investigations. 
The lack of Congressional oversight on the 2002 guideline 
changes and the increased threat they pose to civil liberties 
should compel Congress to take a more active stance on the 
FBI’s activities.  Some recommendations for how Congress 
might place a check on the FBI’s activities are requiring:  (1) 
“prior notice and meaningful consultation before future guide-
line changes can take effect;” (2) “the adoption, following Con-
gressional consultation and comment, of Guidelines for collec-
tion, use, disclosure and retention of public event information 
and data mining;” (3) reports on the impact of the guidelines on 
open society, free speech, and privacy, costs, and benefits; and 
(4) public reporting of statistical information regarding the num-
ber, duration, and cost of investigative inquiries.75 
Domestic surveillance is not a means to peek into the homes 
and lives of our neighbors to discover whether they hold un-
popular political or religious views, but is instead a means of 
getting critical information about domestic threats.  It should be 
executed through targeted investigations without unnecessarily 
compromising the civil liberties of American citizens who are 
merely protesting government policies on different subject mat-
ters.  The FBI’s focus has not remained on one group.  First it 
was Communists, but gradually, the scope broadened to include 
people who opposed the political administration.  The spotlight 
is currently turned onto Muslims and Arabs, but it will inevita-
bly continue to enlarge in scope to peer into the activities and 
opinions of environmental, political advocacy groups, and other 
organizations and individuals, simply because the machinery is 
in place to do so, and there is no red light to stop the FBI.  The 
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articles mentioned earlier in this article and in the lawsuit sug-
gest that the scope has already enlarged.  At this moment, the 
Court has the power to signal a clear red light allowing expe-
dited processing of the requests.  Otherwise, the FBI will take it 
as a green light to continue its activities and fail in its responsi-
bility to comply with the request.  If the Court grants a stay, 
Congress should be on alert that it has the final opportunity and 
responsibility to ask the necessary and vital questions about 
JTTF procedures, protocols, and findings.  Increasingly, the do-
mestic surveillance vehicle meant to protect us from domestic 
threats poses one of the most serious threats to our civil liberties 
and while the power of change rests with Congress, the responsi-
bility to push for it rests with us.  
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